The world correlate chapter 1 continuation

Interpretation and description

     Let supposes or imagine that we have to describe a novel for example, how to do?, repiting the novel again in the description?: the possibility itself is immediately discarted, we will be obligated to separate the main characters with their characteristics, to set aside the script in a post dimension, to abstract the dramaturgy of the plot, to locate the variations and oscillations of the relation between the voice of the author and the voice of major narrators under the fiction, and to relate those instances according to paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, form and content, style and aesthetic, all this things are already implicated and a soon as attaining such a synthesis we will recognize that avoiding the repetition of the whole novel sentence by sentence as a mode of description is already stablishing a relation between a memory of reading and travels of interpretation.

   The same might be sustained about a film, sequences, scenes, frames, cinemas, characters, script, dramaturgy, earlier in the struggle of decomposing the film we are already interpreting in the effort of describing.

    If in the description I say that over the bracket there are various objects, a lighter, a book, several letters, a handkerchief and some wheels of bread I say one thing, but if in the description I say that the letters are letters of travel or intimacy letters I add a textual supplement external to the purely visual according to some information I have or an accent I set.

    If I choice the perspective of an external observer who can’t differentiate the kind of letters in question I am almost describing, but if I add some additional element such as supplementary information I am interpreting in the description itself, I said, over the bracket there are some intimacy letters or letters of travel, we may try then to difference a simple description of elements without relations in between as a list of successive contiguities, one, the next, the next and sucesibly, but as soon I am defining relations in between the elements or including in the description anything train to relate the elements I am already interpreting.

   Of who is the Lighter?, in this about one person or two?, someone was reading the letters alone or was reading it to another person?, the lighter is there because someone was smoking while reading?, or because the subject is anticipating to fire the letters? or to cook the bread?, in a few words there is not in existence a mode to describe without interpreting.

     To the phenomenological point of view in the interpretation of the art work according to Eagleton, we require to be in knowledge of the author conscience, thanks to know it directly from the author or if the author is death by reading biographies, speech, interviews, letters, manuscripts, archive materials guesting on his intentions, motivations, reasons, etc., etc. or if we don’t have any of this two ways, we must instead succor to our own acervos about signs, symbols, icons and objects in culture as well as to our cumulated memory and experience through our own conscience on universal principles of conscience as to interpret by clues the author conscience as expressed in the text, thus this one might be considered as the more usual and frequent way of interpreting.

   But phenomenology can’t avoid the fact that beyond it the text will be interpreted in a pluralist, irreducible, polisemic form by multiple interpreters, can’t avoid the fact that in any case no one will say the same on the text, even semiotic, the science with basis in phenomenology that more accurately attained to demonstrate codification and its principles of communication, can’t avoid it

The Structural Genesis of Text as Concept

   Now the issue of to arrange how must we understand sense and meaning over and beyond polysemy, the semiological elucidation of the principle of codification and the true of communication beyond all that entropy evolved within multiple interpretation is based if we are hermeneutically asking on it in the sense of exegesis on the concept of text and in such a case we need to stablish and define what are we understanding by text.

   We should not forget that the concept of text is itself an structuralist concept, without an structural cut of the relation between language and culture it is impossible to obtain and sustain the autonomy and consistency of the concept of text. On the one hand the text is defined by the activity of reading, as soon as we are reading something already everything and anything we read become to us a form of the text, but such a definition based in reading is saying nothing on text itself, it is necessary at the same time to cut structurally the relation between language and culture, and this structural cut allow us to priories’ and focus a major distinction between Saussure and Peirce.

    The main differences between Saussure linguistic and Peirce semiotic are not well discussed yet. When we said that the Saussure linguistic is structural we said mainly something, that his theory has separated langue from speech, the langue is a convention collected by the academy of the langue and we understand it by it synchronic stability, meaning, here and now the same langue without variations or with minimum variations in time, speech instead is related with the use of langue as structure which only very slowly received certain modifications.

Deep and superficial structure

   Thanks to this structural difference we may then made abstraction of the components of langue as formal facts such as the grammar, grammar is not yet meaning, it is congruence of sense, articulations of coherence, but it is the condition of possibility of meaning. a langue is also a relation of formal elements, the articles entails, the personal pronames defines singularity and plurality, the verbs defines the actions, the place and the to be of the subjects, the adjectives qualify, this is syntax, a superficial structure close to pure form.

   Grammar is not like syntax over or thought the surfaces of forms, it is instead while near to forms more precisely between the forms ruling the logical relations in between it, thus, it is on the side of the logical principles belong to the conceptual, meaningfulness and sense level while not as pertaining to the internal level of content, meaning, concept and sense ontologically as semantique do, defined by relations between forms, it is not form itself ontologically as syntax is, how then to define the ontological place of grammar if it is not exactly on the side of content neither of form?, to get it so, we need to figure out the relation between thought and language, grammar is not on the full side of language, it have all its reality in language and as a language matter, but inhabiting the ledges or empty spaces between language and non-language, or language and thought, it is ontologically on the side of logic rising from that relation, it is then in between the forms regulating the rules of relations between forms according to a constant going and returning from thought to language logically, in this sense there is nothing deep in language than grammar to which deep structure belong, in fact, grammar is itself deep structure in language and syntax the superficial structure, in figuring it so we have a triadic relation.

Thought sense genesis

Sense/Content=Semantique

Grammar=in between logic Deep structure

Form=Sintaxis Superficial structure

Language meaning

     The triadic relation is defined by grammar, syntax and semantique, the first belong ontologically to logic while it is not exactly immaterial as sense and meanings are, instead it is in between forms being a dimension of it something about which we will need later to revise and discuss the relation between form and content, it belong to the principles that relates logically forms in between according to sense and contents, the second live in the surface of forms, it is form itself ontologically, while articulated as language, the last one belong to the immaterial dimension of sense, content, meaning so that ontologically semantique is clouse to thought than to language while located as a phenomena of language, syntax is near to language than to thought and grammar is in between, whence structurally speaking semantique is on the side of genesis, grammar on the side of deep structure and syntax on the side of superficial structure, the triadic principle however explain by itself that the elements are not separated but folded one into and through the other, nothing as grammar is possible without syntax, nothing as semantique is possible without syntax and grammar while syntax’s however as ever form is more independent than grammar and semantique but yet equally affected by it.

The Significant

   The significant is by excellence the more well defined intermedia between deep and superficial structure, it is a consequence of the relation of both or in best words located in between, compared with meaning –significance--which is purely immaterial as something without a body, a corpus, a vehicle or a dimension that meet in forms.

   Derrida discussed at this point the homology of the relation between body and soul, the body is the significant and soul the meaning—the significance, the significant is thus on the side of forms inside the sign, the material one side, near to syntax than to grammar, it belong more to superficial structure and less to the deep one, but it is incomprehensible if completely diluted or disseminated in pure syntax, the grammar level sake it too or it have its source and rise in between both as an expression more of superficial and less but also of deep structure at the same time.

   It is the anticipation in form of meaning toward it, as the word said signicant, ready to mean but without doing it yet, before the taking shape of it yet, in this sense the significant as one of the three main sides of the sign, significant/referent and/meaning or significance and paradoxically is the one side of the sign more related with the structural stability of language, why paradoxically?, well because a word must have many meanings according to how to associate it with other words as well as according to how seize its whole sense, but its form will ever be the same and equal ever

    On the other hand, the significant is the side of the sign which allow us to entrance to culture, why?, why the significant and not the significance if as we suppose a culture is nothing but a collection of meanings?, well because under meanings we are already in culture but without an entrance or an exit to it, to entrance and exist it we need in language a pure form from which to go and return inside and outside culture, culture in fact is nothing but a subsystem as parson discussed it, we also have the subsystem of the individual and of the social as well as the economic subsystem, so that to fully entrance in culture we must exit the social, a purely social will never be culture fully, equally with the individual and the economic

   And as such to the structural cut between language and culture we need forms, in this sense, structurally speaking the significant is then our way to comply and access culture from language

   In a few words, while culture is itself meaning, paradoxically, it can’t be comply and or acceded from language through contents, sense and meaning, but through significance, the surface that belong to syntax is here pivotal, nothing as a relation between language and culture might be structurally sustained than by finding in form the source of that relation, but form itself, is not sufficient to cross to culture, an intermedia one between surface and the immateriality of meanings is need to add and get the touch and pass by between language and culture, of course, language is culture and culture is language already but thus the relation is not structural, to be structural it have to be constant and relatibly invariable so to speak, and here we have the relevance of the significant and of syntax.

   When we say that the significant is mainly matter and form we need to figure out in a more deeper manner how matter and form are related in between so to return later to the significant and scrutinize what characterize it in is difference to the immateriality of meaning and significance the reflected, grounded and sometimes representational nature of the referent in denotation.

    Let see how Hegel discussed this relation

   If we made abstraction in all its determinations, said Hegel—of all the form of something we get then as result indetermined matter. Matter is an abstract in absolute, it is impossible to see or to touch the matter, what we see or touch is ever an specific matter, meaning, the union between matter and form. This abstraction, from were matter source, is not an elimination extrinsique to form, but instead form is reduced by itself, as result to this simple identity

  Besides, form presupposes a matter with what it is related. But precisely by that both are not one in front of the other in an extrinseque form or accidental, neither matter or form exist each one by itself, matter is what is indifferent to the determination of the identity with itself from which form return as to its base. Form presuppose matter and reciprocally form is presupposed by matter, form and matter, are thus determined one by the other one, matter contain form inclusive in itself because it is form only itself and just because it have it inside, whence, form have to be materialized and matter have to be formed, meaning

to happen in matter own identity and because form is the absolute identity with itself and contains matter in itself and because matter in it pure abstraction have form in itself the activity of form over matter and the becoming the last one determined by the former is nothing else than the superation of the appearance of indifference and diversity. This relation of determining is thus the mediation of each one with itself by the mean of its own non being but these two mediations constitute only one movement and the reestablishing of its originary identity, Pp, 397.398

    The issue of abstracting with Saussure the structural synchronic stability of langue in respect to the diachronic variability of speech might be understanded from the side of how langue is reflected in the academy of langue as a form of institutionalism, meaning, the study of language with basis in its instituted form, but at the same time, beyond institutions in the study of langue’s as available to the world of acquisition and learning, as well as the performance of it as what stablish the patters of convention is here clear as an arrange of meanings around signs, words, sentences and the principles organize it gramatic, syntactic, etc., following the same order which allow us to set aside the structural analysis in formal logics of grammar and syntax, may persuade us that something similar might be possible around meanings and not only around formal issues of deep and superficial structure, meaning that according to a similar principle both the instituted level of language as well as its comprehension from the side of the conventions entrance within learning, allow us to consider if meanings with independency of the issue of polysemy’s, entropies and multiples interpretation, are susceptible to be studied by its stability, meaning structurally.

   Well, I have a well-defined individual response to this question and my answer is yes and not. Not because meanings are highly affected by contexts and situations and we can easily demonstrate how the conventions about pre-given meanings which help the subject to acquire and learn a language to be performance, are not as such when that language is performed in a variability of interactive, communicative, situational and contextual circumstances, and yes from the moment the process of learning could be separated and studied as a moment itself.

   An studied as such might be for example discussed as papers and books focused in both the teaching and the learning to speak and write a langue in a variety of forms, from the moment of the acquisition of a mother native langue, to the moments of learning a new langue or idiom by those how have a previous acquired native mother langue, might be also developed as theories of the teaching and learning itself, while obviously, the possibilities are limited

  Now it is indeed amazing to perceive to what point semantique is based in such an hypothesis, almost all the semantic theories in existence from the starting of semantic studies to our current days are based in a positive answer to that question, the presupposition that as well as the formalism of grammatology and sintaxsis, phonetic and lexicology is possible thanks to the structural cut of the relation between language and culture, semantic, the study of sense and meaning might be set aside and studied structurally too from the stability side as well.

   semantiques

    I am not so enthusiastic less optimistic with such a perspective which is certainly in the basis of almost all the trips and logical tables of semantic previous theory, simply because sense and meanings are itself inmaterials, related, as Derrida clarified by using the homology of the relation body and soul to separate in language matter and sense, with the soul so to speak and in doing so we are already in a territory outside the synchronic stability of structural cuts which are mainly related with form and matters as discussed above.

   Instead of that, my perspective is focused in superficial structure, the possibilities of semantics developed from the study of syntaxes. Instead of a semantic project based in the supposed to be guaranties of convention and pre-given meaning of instituted langue, my focus is turned to the studies and sense and meanings in surfaces interactions

      Signifier and meaning are nothing else than in respect to the general logic form and content while in general logic nothing was conceived as a sign in that sense, beside the sign appeared as an issue in Aristoteles organum and later in Hegel, nothing as enteiling sign with that pair was yet suspected less even the Derrida comparison of both sides of the sign with body and soul, it was instead disseminated or dispersed through a whole chain of things such as sensible multiplicities and palpable sensoriality and reflexivity without yet a sense of internal unity to the sign less the internal division of the sign triadic principle of signifier, meaning and referent

   Now, revisiting the issue of form and content in general logic might help to go in deep about the ontology of it, how to understand form and matter its tangibility, intelligibility, its presence as something possible to be listen, read or see as readable, graphically written, audible, etc with the intangible, ideal, stereos, immaterial side of meanings?

     Content, according to Hegel, have in a first place a form and a matter belong to it as essentials, contents constitute the unity of it. But given that this unity is at the same time determined and putted unity, content is in front of the forms, form constitute in front of content a putted being and as such represent the inessential

    Whence, content is indifferent in front of the form, while content have a form and matter itself. Secondly is also the identical in form and matter, so that form and matter are only indifferent and extrinsique determinations

    Both are in general a putted being but returning in contents to its unity. The identity of content with itself represent once the former identity indifferent to form, but content is at the same time the negative reflection of this formal determinations in itself, its unity, which firstly is only the indifferent unity in respect to form and whence also the formal unity, content is by the essence identical with itself that evolution to be the fundamental relation, but content is determined in itself not only in the matter of matter, meaning, as the indifferent in general, but as formed matter hence the determinations of forms have a material indifferent subsistence

And continuing with the issue essence Hegel sustained

     Essence have a form and formal determinations. It have an stabilitized inmediations, meaning a substrate. But essence as a related substrate, is determined essence, it have essentially form inside it. The determinations of form are now determinations inside essence, it is in the base as indetermined, so that essence is precisely in a essential matter determinated whence represent also another time the moment of the fundamental relation of forms, this is the absolute mutual relation of forma and essence, but in this essence is determined so it is a negative distinguished from form as its basis beside at the same time that essence become itself a moment of form, whence form have in its own identity the essence and essence have absolute forms in its own identity, so that we can’t ask how to add a form to an essence because the former is nothing else that the apparition of the second inside it, form determine essence, besides, form eliminates all that and become in the identity with itself of essence

      We have thus seen how form and content are related beside form and essence so that if we bring it from general logic to language in order to elucidate the ontology of the signifier as the formal and material side of the sign as to quest then how is it entailed with the ideal, immaterial side of meaning, we unveil that it work similarly to how form and content are related in between while without discarding the major place of form in respect to the substrates of the so-called essence, however, the sign is not composed only by signifier and meaning, but also by reference and referenciality

   In fact, meaning as the immaterial, ideal, intangible side of the sign beyond its relation with convention, is needed of a relation with such a third element of referentiality, since reference or denotatum is at the same time a reflected object by the sign as something that seem to fall out of the sign, but it is at the same time designed or indicated by it and as such is a part of it , meaning instead fall out in respect to the sign as in between significants, form and matter, and the referent so that we have then:

Sing: =significant (form) + significance =meaning (content) +reference, (referent)

     Thus, meaning is not cast over or upon not cast inside forms as contained, but it is on the one hand immaterial but on the other it is between form or matter and referentiality, so between significants and reference

     How then to relate, entail and comprehend the differences and possible relations between Saussure significants and Peirce interpretants?