Thinking science chapter 4 end

 This is not a way to say that I don’t have certain point of coincidences with spinosa, according to him man is carry away as man don’t know to where he is going as according to him dominated by wishes and appetite, this is out of doubt sustained since to spinosa man have to devote his love only to god and let it to god determinations the destine of man, while to me man is certainly wrong in giving so to his intentional and instrumental purposes, but instead of to let his destine in the hands of god, to be open to a plural listening remembering Barthes know phrase, a plural listening is needed when love instead of convenience and lineal purposes, regulates the horizonts of his wishes, in Spanish we have a best word to that which is wrong: voluntarism.

 When I recognizer an affective dimensions of symbols to the self I am considering the concept of affect distinguished between fondness and unfodness, affective is that to which we have a fondnesss something that by certain motives we want and is retained as agreeable, pleasant, acceptable, related with a sense of gratitude, something we don’t want to unfasten or to detach or untie as easier, something about which we return to it always with a feeling of love.

   However, affect is not an intrinsique propriety of the objects and symbols themselves but before well a feeling of the subject something belong to the universe of subjectivity thus for example let imagine a person not so familiarized with rock as music and culture, not to the rock symbols, faces, hears, dresses, body attitudes , images, words and texts to such kind of persons rock is identified with a chain of things unrelated with affect but all the contrary with unfasten, but to a young girl who thanks to rock culture learned from her earlier life to express herself against the restrains of conservative culture on her body and feeling expressions we might imagine the sense of affect that rock as culture means to her, it probably helped her to meet her first boyfriend and or even starting her sexual life, so that even if later in her life she have take distance from rock environments it will ever be a symbol of affect in her life.

  Here we have a clear example about we can’t adjudicate affect to certain things instead of another, affect belong to the subject not to symbols and objects as much.

  Another example, to a certain individual the cutted hair of another person seen for example in the flour of a cutting hair shop might have connotative escatological things of bad taste or a sensation of superstition but to another person to which the hair belongs as a memory of the cutted hair when he or she was a child or as the hair of his or her grandmother hair it have an affective content an is provided by a sense of love and fodnees.

   We must then extend this to many things from our surrounding environments of life and habitat in which multisensoriality, liveness and experience are evolved, like in the rock example whole even by more reasons things such as television and medias accompanying our everyday life at home such as the internet become symbolized with a sense of affect to the idealization of the interior world subjectivity and its self-phenomenology, this is the case also to free market and publicities surrounds our everyday quotidian cities environments.

   Here we have the Bachelard analysis on the house, on the intimacy living room, on the noises of the city which the subject transform in affective symbols as soon as having to experience a convival with it for example during the sleeping moment the noise of the city from another perspective seen as strange become by repetition associated with affective senses of custom.

  We have stablishes in the former discussion the self of the individual person seen as a plenum individual and understanding it in piaget and mead sense while discussed how the idealized sense of the social as otherness entrance to isolated and selfsameness monadic interiority of the single subject, how the real others avoided through and transformed by imagination as an alter ego evolving to the self the subject self-esteem, but we must yet be deeper in discussing this sense of the liveness individual by remembering a beautiful definition of it by Hegel

Hegel said:

   "Live considered only as such a negative unity of its own objectivity and particularization is a life refereed only to itself, life exist by itself, meaning that it is itself a soul. With this life is essentially an individual who is referred to objectivity as his otherness, the original judgement of life consist hence in that life is separated as an individual subject in respect to the objective. Whence, life is a first place have to be considered as an alive individual which is itself a subjective totality or whole and which is presupposed as indifferent in front of an objectivity which is in front of him or her as indifferent too itself.

   In a second sense live is a vital process. In the taking shape of the alive individual itself it is already in tension against its originary presupposition and set itself as subject in front of such a presupposed objective world. The subject is an end in itself which have its means and subjective reality in objectivity, in this form it is constituted as the independent essential in front of the external world which have only to him a negative value which lack of independence. In its own sentiment about himself the liveness individual have the certitude of the nullity of this objective external existence itself since it lack of independence and as such it is to him an otherness in front of him

  His impulse is the necessity to the alive individual to eliminate such an otherness to give to himself the certitude of his own certainly, his independence. The individual as subject, its subjective process in itself from which he grow and the immediate objectivity he set as a natural mean adequate to its own concept, is mediated by the process referred to such an exteriority seen as an objective totality outside him as its otherness, an otherness which is joined with him, in coexistence with him and indifferent to him as much as he is indifferent to it

   This process start with the necessity, meaning with the moment from which the alive individual thus reference to an objectivity which is an otherness in front of him, this is the impulse to set by himself in that world another to him, to eliminate it and to objectify himself, this is the reason because his self-determination have the form of an external objectivity and by the fact that he is identical to himself at the same time.

   However, as such as this negative moment is realized in the form of his own objectivity particularity, meaning, as such as the essential moments of his own unity are realized by itself as a whole, his own independent totality, the concept become itself unfold thus in its absolute inequality with itself and because of the absolute division of this two things, the alive individual is thus by itself this unfold and have as its own sentiment this contradiction

   This division of the alive individual in itself is a sentiment interiorized in his sensibility. The identity which is in the impulse of his subjective certitude of himself according to which the alive individual reference to the external world as an indifferent existence, as an appearance or as another reality which is to him inessential and lack of concept. Such an external reality need to receive or acquire a concept that only can acquire in the subject as an immanent end, meaning, the indifference of the objective world in front of the immanent determination of the subject as subjective end

   This transformation of the process of the alive individuality constitute the return of such an external objectivity to itself by and only through subjects end and its own end by that reason the production of such a pass by to another the subject of the alive individual versus the objective reality become a reproduction in which the alive individual set himself as identical with itself, he give to himself the feeling and sentiment of himself, in fact, he set himself as what he is meaning as identical to himself being another and or an otherness to such an exteriority, so he set himself as indifferent to it, this is nothing but the unity of the negative of the negative

  Through the realized process in relation with the presupposed world at the same time he set himself by itself as the negative unity of his being another, as the base of himself. The individual is thus the reality of the idea in a manner as such that now he produces himself from reality as before produced himself only from the concept, this source before given as presupposed is now transformed in its own production

  However, the further determination attained by the mean of eliminating the supposed to be opposition, is nothing more than to be a genre as identity with his previous being indifferent, this idea of the individual being such an identity is his particularization

  This division according to the totality from which he is originated, the duplicity of the individual, is itself the presupposition of an objectivity identical with him and is a reference to the alive individual itself, as to another alive individual. The identity with the other, the universality of the individual is whence only internal and subjective".

    A part of this symbolic universe is attended by psychoanalysis in the sense of Freud relating such symbolisms with sexuality even in the sense of Jung, but our attention here in not focused in that part of the affective dimension of symbols to the self.

   This is not a way to say that we negate the importance of sexuality in life and the affective universe of the individual and the self, in fact, we believe that sexuality is a major very important dimension of affective life as well as to the self-formation and development, we are just pointing that our focus on the issue is not sexological as when sex is the object of analysis, our individual person in fact, we, any of us, me, you, he or her, is not here the object of a science studying him or her as an object, something more accurately related with psychology, our attention is focused instead on how the individual processing the social and cultural world through his or her idealized interiority take shapes of a self and in reverse, on how the self already formed as belonging to the individual, incorporate that world which permeate us from the social and cultural.

  I believe certainly that through such phenomenology as a micro perspective seen from the fully individual as totality culture and society are both intelligible, readable and interpretable.

    Thus as this sociological perspective evolve cultural analysis as something highly singularized through the individual phenomenology of the self I has called this self-ethnography.

   The concept of ethnography however as we well know is also polemic and susceptible of confusions by several reasons, a considerable part of what ethnography was and is was referred to other people and cultures considered from the evolutionist point of view and from our western perspective as primitives and tribals, in this sense ethnography was usually seen as a science of people and societies distinct to us or from another ways as a native ethnology, meaning an ethnology done by ethnologists on their own culture.

    My concept of ethnography is radically distant and separated from both senses and meanings of the concept both epistemologically and teleologically, as well as methodologically and ontologically in terms of its scientific basis.

   First I am not speaking here on others and otherness considered as a matter of the stranger character of another culture to the culture of the author, nor about relations of otherness involving others defined as culturally differents or as relations between our western culture and nonwestern ones, but from a philosophical and sociological perspective I am speaking on the relation between the individual and the social in our own contemporary western culture in which to the individual any other in society is another and evolve symbolic otherness to the individual self, just like it is considered at the level of intersubjective communication, the one who enunciate is from his own gaze and self an I and the one who listen is another or an otherness to the first one and the same in reverse, the one who counter enunciate from his perspective is an I and a self and the one who first enunciated is now another involving symbolisms of otherness to the second one.

  Also as discussed in this chapter at the level of the idealized interiorizations of that social dimension seen from the individual as something reflected under the self-phenomenology the social mean to the self-individual subject a sense of otherness and is transformed by the internal individual self while reflected under it to the point that we can from a plenty individualized sense do cultural analysis on the self-formation and transformations, philosophically and a sociologically around both concrete individuals in the empirical field and abstract individuals as ideals types universalities of the internal phenomenology of the self, developing reflections around experience, acervos, backgrounds, memories and so on, etc.

   The individual is then here the I in a singular and a we in the plural universality contained in the I from the moment each individual is at the same time a single one identical with itself while separated from the social and a single of the plural at the social level of multiples ones, while as we well know the relation between the individual and the social discussed through the self-phenomenology is one about the mutual permeability of both sides the permeability of the self by the social and cultural and the socialization returns from the self to the social.

   Why self-ethnography then to define a form of cultural analysis that is about ourselves in our own western culture?, instead of a native ethnology as the former mentioned above?, because the so-called native ethnology is about a culture considered as an ethnologically and ethnic constituted collective culture understanded outside of the individual or seen the individual as determined by such ethnological composition of a culture collectively, so from parameters completely outside of the individual.

   A self-ethnography as I has defined instead of that it is not about a culture considered as the culture to which natives pertain, but culture is analyzed and discussed only through, from, cutted, framed, theorized, studied and comprehended inside the individual self-phenomenology and concerning only from what is reflected at this level.

   This concept of ethnography is then accompanied here by the suffix self not as a native ethnology in regard to a collective culture to which that self-pertain, but from the perspective of the philosophical classical discussion on universal parameters of individuality, one and multiple, being and becoming, self and the social, in this sense we might sustain that here the concept of ethnography is recalled, redefined and retheorized from a discussion in philosophy that relocates epistemologically philosophical anthropology, as discussed in the previous chapter.

   It is in fact, a concept belong to philosophical anthropology and as such incorporated into phenomenological sociology, instead of calling ethnomethodology from the tradition of western nonwestern cultures traditional ethnography, instead of incorporating symbolic interactionism of sociology under the inquiries and questions of ethnography in such a tradition referred above I am proposing exactly the opposite, the incorporation of ethnography retheorized from epistemology into ethnometology in contemporary, modern sociology which is in fact phenomenological sociology considering the whole chain of related notions, ethnomethodology, symbolic interactionism and so on.

   With all this say we understand the objection evolved in the question, if you are practicing phenomenological sociology, ethnomethodology in the autonomous disciplinary tradition of sociology as a science on ourself as contemporary western culture, why to use the concept of ethnography instead of just saying ethnomethodology?

   Well, I think that this an strong argument to be considered because it is without doubt a true, however, I have a series of questions in regard to this objection.

   How to resolve the true that we don’t have in the tradition of phenomenological sociology –including ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism seen from the very autonomy of sociology as science cultural analysis and as soon as e are committed to include cultural analysis under the epistemological parameters of phenomenological sociology how to define and name what results from that?

   I don’t have by now another answer to this question than defining it as self-ethnography, if I find in the future a better way less susceptible to semantique confusions about a concept, than this one, I will for sure let know about it to my readers.

   By which I mean excluding mixings resulted from the opposite sort of move when ethnomethodology from sociology is incorporated by from and into the kind of ethnography mentioned above since such mixings at the level of this regard on disciplines autonomies might creates a confused image of what ethnomethodology was and is itself seen from and how it born and grow in sociology autonomy before being incorporated into ethnography.

  Can we do however re-incorporations might be then the next logical question? by which I mean now asking if can we from phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology at sociology disciplinary autonomy since exploring cultural analysis as something new in this tradition in sociology, re-incorporate into our research references to forms of ethnography that from the old sense of ethnography discussed above had incorporated into it ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism from sociology?. Well the answer to this question must be considered as a matter of both choosing it with pincers when pertinently needed in empirical cases of cultural analysis and considering specific cases epistemologically evaluated from the rules of sociology autonomy.

Bibliography

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Deleuze Gilles, The Problem of knowledge and of ethics, Empiricism and subjectivity, an essay on Hume theory of human nature, Columbia university press

Derrida Jacques, Introduction to Hegel Semiology, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press

Derrida Jacques, Introducción a la semiología de Hegel, Márgenes de la Filosofía, Catedra

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