The world correlate chapter 2

The World Correlate

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

     Written in English and translated to English

by Abdel Hernandez San Juan

 The center focus of this essays is to solve epistemological and methodological questions belong not only to the theoretical and conceptual contents of the text but also to what I will like to define here as world correlate.

    In fact the theoretical and conceptual content of the text understanded as a porposivennes endless in Kantian terms belong to the self-transcendence motivation by the mean of which in theoretical thought one feel himself enchantment by the plenum sense of the said of the theoretical content itself, something usually replaces the effective realization of the relation between that thought and reality,

   In the same mode than with Peirce the sign substitutes the object or occupy an space in the place of something else, a substitution of the former by the chain of meanings according to interpretants which translate one to the other, the self-sufficiency of theoretical thinking seems to dispense of a world or a reality.

   Also similarly than the formal logic of significants as a signs chain in an incessant succession when it looks to be not exiting to the exterior of language not from the way of meaning, neither from the way of representation, the theoretical thinking looks to be usually enclosed in language insides.

    Significants in between them stablish a chain without references to meanings, a kind of another surface we might understated as superficial structure, the decurse of syntax, developing in between them differential relations from which what it is not defines what it is, the starting of the spacialiaition of difference.

   Like interpretants and significants the struggle of theoretical thinking use to be limited by a substitution of objects and meanings inhabited by a kind of self-sufficiency, Beth significants endless chan and Interpretants endless semiosis remember the general situation of thought in respect to reality and or a world.

    Althouth the Peirce interpretants consistido in signs translating in between each one to the other, nothing as the separations between langue and speech which define the synchronic here and now in front of the diachronic, neither a distintion between writing and speach, a in the basis of The Interpretants sorce.

The structural stability characterize grammatik, syntactic, morphological or even phonetic levels defined how the significants born and grow in structuralist linguistic as result of the sincronic cutted between lingue and speach is far to the principles allow peirce to conceive the interpretants, neither defined by the sentences performance acts of speech in the sense of Austin, the interpretant born directly from a poshegelian philosophical reflection peirce was committed to develop in between language and referente, signs and inferences, qualities of things and sínthesis of representation, a cognitive unity allow some semiologists to derive semiotic from the philosophy of language if we remember how major as this issue of language-eality during the first décades of analítical philosophy, eco for example sustained parental relation between semiotic and the philosophy of langyuage.

    The interpretants on the other hands are related with the anticipation of readers and viewers in language building what eco defined as reading if fabulation.

    Peirce interpretants as Carlos sini discussed, applies to issues outside alphabetic language as for example spatial signs, a hen iron place in the external outside sealing of a rural house according to how the hen of iron turn in one direction or the other, it helps the village people to recognize the direction of the wind, this are nothing else that the field of indicial signs, the signs as clues.

  In the logic at the same time structural of superficial syntax and of pure form by which instead the significants are defined in between by differential relations comes to the forefront the countless level of words needed in the dictionary to surround a word to be defined so that the sense is dispersed in a chain of successive senses to the infinity.

     But at the same time theoretical thought self-sufficiency that enclose it without exit to an exterior of language or relation with a world correlate or practicity, presuppose advancing and communicating in the mode of the hypothesis topoi realizing as hypothesis a supposed to be world as it is configured according to theory as world itself while at the same time it seems to fall in the well-known dilemma of symbolism when a recognition was attributed to the symbols, the potential as well as the limitation to solution in a symbolic imagery level what is not solve and or contradictory in reality.

   My allusion to this aporetical closed way of theory however is far to be related with the old ideologies separed theory from practice understanding the last one as an application of the former, or the former as subordinated to the purposiveness of the last one since such an ideology derives in antitheoreticism, my precisions are not addressed to priories practice over theory before well to the fact that from theorizing toward its own purposiveness has conducted to a renounce to the relation between pure trues of theory and its correlate of a world and a reality limited by such a replacement of real contradictions by symbolic, imaginary solutions.

   Focused in the scientific certitude that the ways of solutions is mainly theoretical and that theoretical trues presuppose an amazing vintage over a naïf idea of practice, an in attention to the ethical, moral and responsibility superiority of theory in front of those who believe in practical solutions, the purposiveness of this essay is about to attempts and attain to discuss a form of theorization more attentive to the world correlates and reality although this world and reality are considered inside theoretical objectives.

   This is the question of the relation between theorizing and its correlates of world affect our epistemological priorities since pragmatism, phenomenology, hermeneutic and even logical positivism.

   To start my discussion I would like to set aside here a crucial scientific problem, that one of the phenomenology of the real and reality as considered among the classical discussion on phenomena, appearance and presence toward us to the distinctions between world itself and the phenomenological world, to the phenomenological complexion of an idea of reality, to the nominalist issue of the relation between language and reality, language and world the issue which in fact started this essays around the logical query on the relations between a supposed to be absolute inside of language without exit to an exterior, the sign replacement of the objects and references, or the significants replacement of meaning, and on the opposite the several correlates which relativize such an inside placing us between us and language according to which remembering derrida language is again trapped in an exteriority between thought and being, on the one hand, and between the phenomenology of the world of life and reality on the other.

    "This unity---sustained Hegel in the science of logic—between the interior and the exterior is the absolute reality, the interior is determined as the form of the inmediation reflected, meaning, of the essence in front on an exterior determined as the form of being, but both are only a unique identity, this identity is in a first place the pure unity of both as a basis full of content

   Whence, this identity is continuity and is the totality that represent the interior which become also in an exterior, but in this it is not yet something becoming or trespassing but identical with itself, the exterior according to this determination is nothing else than the interior or equal to it according to a content, both are only a unique thing

   However, this thing as simple identity with itself is different to its own determination of form, meaning that the determinations are extrinsiques to it hence it is itself an interior which is different to the exterior, but this exterior consist in that both determinations the interior and the exterior constitute it. Whence given that the interior and the exterior are considered as determinations of form both are first the simple form and second because determined as opposite the unity is the pure abstract mediation from which one is immediately the other in thus the interior is nothing else but the exterior and in reverse the exterior is nothing else but the interior

  In fact, precisely in this opposition of both world the difference had disappeared at what supposed to be world itself is at the same time a phenomenological world and in reverse, the phenomenological world in itself is itself an essential world, phenomenological world and world itself, whence, are each one the totality of the reflection identical it itself, world itself and phenomenological world, one would supposed to be reflected and the other in itself, but each one is continued in the other whence each one is at the same time the identity of both moment, a reflected totality and an immediate supposed to be different are as such because each one have inside itself the other. 447-448"

     The paragraphs we have rehearse address us to one of the most beautiful, rich and complex passages on the classical phenomenological questions on phenomena, appearance, reality, essence which completion an amazing and perplex synthesis idea of reality, on the relation between world itself and the phenomenological world, however, nothing as a forth issue started since logical positivism about the relation between language and reality, language and world are there yet discerned.

     In fact, assumed the complexity of the phenomenological issue of ontology nothing as the exteriority between language and world were required something that arises since beyond the real crystalize in appearance and presence or between what is itself and what is reflected, the question of its representation appear to us, thus that we are concerned here with a language from which an idea of reality is created more or less adequately represented.

   Or to advance it in a more developed form on how distinguishing the relation between language and reality omething is evolved in our deliberations about objectivity and subjectivity from which the issue of subject and object source.

       It is well known to all of us the usual and generalized suspicious on the more hard side on analytical philosophy and earlier positivism from which a sometimes inflexible idea of distinguishing subject and object as cutted things started, between other things because such an exteriorized form might tend to offer a rigid and over added superposition by which the subject of knowledge appear as a cold observer unrelated with which he or she is observing and the supposed to be relative and discussible idea of objectivity evolved in it, the idea that objectivity, in fact, hesitate in from of subjectivity with the exception of the quantic relativist physicians idea about that the observer is involved in that which is observed much more than as supposed and over the naïf idea of a distant observer whose observation report an objective data without being permeated with the color of subjectivity usually seen as something that never receive the influences of it.

    Now the concept of object finds in classical philosophy a certain evolution or ways to be discerned or perceived, from its first forms in the mode of self-assure. The idea of self-assure in fact, presupposed the simultaneity between the ontology of what simply is and become and our assure on it as reflected in the subject, it was the pass by from impressions to the relations between the sensible and the intelligible toward concepts and concepts of concepts, only through the exteriorization between the subject and that ontology allow us to differentiate that such an ontology might be a time pure being understanded as the being of one self, the human being in its becoming, time, but might be too another time the world of another thing distinct of him or her as subjects and not always a simple alterity of him or her in front of him or herself, my discussion of the intermedia space of the self between immanence and reflection, the apparition of us in front of us in conscience.

   In preceding such another thing different to us within the impressions of ontology we have on the one hand the relation between substances and being, certainly, that which simply is, looks to be entailed with being by a sensible dimension according to which we perceive time and becoming, it is the logic entail the sensible to the intelligible by which the sensible correspond to our being, the datas of our senses, and the intelligible to the self-assure elucidation of such dates of the sense as reflected in the subject comprehensión.

   But on the other hand, when such another thing ontology mean to us and about which the subject take notes in its assure means something radically distinct to the subject, we find the sense of pure becoming without us, time and happens which sometimes is the happening of substance, sometimes pure time, sometimes a pure event or a fall out that seems to pertain to the subject only from the side of the relation between substance and being something leads us to think on how substance is for example present in language --derrida ousia and gramme--or also in the mode of Leibniz, Espinosa and Hegel finded it even in conscience and the organism.

   The original conception of Leibniz about the monad in fact, although we understand it usually in a modern phenomenological sense, meaning, without substance, was indeed based in the analysis of substance evolving the chemical and physical world.

  While we should return to the question on how the essence of such a supposed to be ontology is divided and superated by the immateriality of concepts and concepts of concepts as well as to recognize that differences between logical positivism in respect to what relate subject and non-subject, conceptualism and nominalism beside also the semiotical perspective as Peirce discussed it since Peirce several decades after based his theory in empirical research around substance, but he later recognized how it is required to erase and or remove substance out of and to work without it something, a later position he defined as positive when he said that phenomenology is the first positive science something about which I am agree with.

   Beside that we need distinctions between Peirce interpretation of nominalism and conceptualism because as much as conceptualism and nominalism required apriories also positivism is needed of it.

    In the same mode that Hegel about who Peirce recognized himself as a continuator in front of the question about if the world have a beginning he established it as the right now when we well know that there is in the time of now also a past that is not already and a future that is not yet, the apriories of conceptualism and nominalism are not as different as the apriory of positivism as Peirce supposed, at the end, it is about recognizing as much as we recognize the right now of time as beginning of the world, that the subject and subjectivity are also beginnings as much as and at the same time that being is a beginning to science, other ways how to explain the immediate and simultaneous assure or self-assure as reflected in the subject?, we suppose a being that simply is without extrinsecation to it, certainly, but we are already there taking assure of it at the same time so it is already reflected in us as subject as well as already a concept, the concept of "being itself", this simultaneity of the beginning allow us to recognize that subject and object is a source relation and that as an a priory this distinction is the same to conceptualism, nominalism and phenomenology or what Peirce defined as the first form of positive science.

  Thus, the question is not as much about the differences in between but about asking why the two firsts, conceptualism and nominalism are not always recognized in phenomenology, certainly, decades after Peirce, some forms of positivism recognized itself in phenomenology while some others not, we might attempt to prub and attain that today the challenge consist about, after the generalized suspicious to positivism, to reconcile phenomenology, conceptualism and nominalism while incorporating in the form of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language positivism into it, as earlier Peirce anticipated.

   Such a turn evolves of course certain consequences to conservative positivism which should accept a dissemination of certain of its original purposiveness but without losing the main distinction made equivalence of the aprioris around the distinction of subject and object.

   In fact, after derrida efforts to demostrarte the indecidibility between inside/outside language the paradoxes relatives both sides the idea of medlee vice appeared precesilly to try to solution the paradox, but derrida medlee vice, we should not forget it is nothing then return to The relation subjectar-object even if to try to see it in another form or posibilities.

 The crucial point of this reflection seize in the fact that all we need is a cut between subject and object sufficient as to maintain the space of a certain exteriorization between language and world, language and eality even if to explore another posibilities far to the earlier positivist cold or objective observer.

   Language, of course, is a part of the reflected phenomenological world ontologically speaking as reflected in subjectivity in front of the objectual world of referentiality a distinction after all involved or presupposed in Peirce semiotic from the moment he required to differentiate the sign from the object as well as the reflection of the object in the sign.—the representatement—from the aspect of the sign addressed to or toward the object—the ground, from the correlates in between establishes the interpretants, since certainly nothing as the object reflected in the sign might be considered as the same than the denotative dimension, the first correspond to the representational level the second to the level of meaning.

   The difference regarding subject and object in conceptualism and nominalism as in analytical philosophy and the philosophy of language in general consist about that we permanence as subjects exteriorized in front of the object as to return ever on this relation in its various heterogeneous moments, nor only as aprioris of the subject as a beginning in front of being and the couple as to himself alterized not only as well when the object is another thing far to the subject quality but overall as to continue forth both in the synchronic as in the after so that the relation between subjectivity and objectivity stay always under assure.

   Once considering the subject directly without language once by the mediation of language a certain extrinsecation is naturally needed to understand how subjectivity and objectivity are working in the several empirical regards since we also have the objectivity of subjectivity and the subjectivity of objectivity, both are at the end correlates of such an assure.

   While the Peirce semiotic is more focused in decodification, meaning and interpretation instead of on observation, we might apply the same to meaning and interpretation as well, in one perspective we address the research on this relation subject object toward language and reality, language and world, in the other we seize semantique, meanings, interpretation and communication.

 From one perspective we pay attention to knowledge from the other one to communication, while in both we need inference, deduction and induction but besides Peirce semiotic is required of triadic and dyadic principles triadic: sign-representatement-ground-correlate-interpretant, indicial, clues, icons, symbols, etc., dyadic: denotation, connotation, in a similar form we need conceptualization, abstraction, subjectivity, objectivity.

  When the subject and subjectivity are more than forms of the subject assure --self perception or alterity-- to become principles of meaning the former are disseminated in the signs and the idea of an outside of language before end, at the same time and an outside after in respect to language, become relative, it is like when reality --the chain of objects out there--is replaced by meaning all the real is thus disseminate inside language as if nothing else as an extrinsecation to it were possible.

  But the opposite may be sustained at the same time around the same, one time we recognize subject, predicaments, being, self, etc, etc, as functions of signs trapped in language, verbs, adjectives, substantives, etc, etc, other time we perceive all this as a dimension of the subject outside language, when language itself as derrida demonstrated appears as a form of the idealized flour of interiority through which we have a self perception of ourself exteriorized in language, or trapped between being and thougth --being=wishes to say as eidos and noesis in the origin of the genesis of sense decides the taking shape of language writing or speach--, thought=logic, or simply relativized from everyday pragmatiques and experience.

  In a few words the simultaneous affirmation on the same as a duality of the true leads us to the classical discussion of phenomenology on the internal and the external, world it self and phenomenological word are nothing but the same in two different moment, both are inclusive oposites, a pair of both samennes and counterposition, the internal is nothing but the external and in reverse, our quote of Hegel earlier in this chapter.

  Under conceptualism indeed we never lost a certain exteriority to language, we continue using language, between us and language noematic relations between thought, being and language rules the mediation.

  Thought and language continue extrinseques so as to know its relations, by the way language at this point appear related with the expressive dimensión of being in a form that reality is presented or appear again to language, the moments of reflection between one and the other are internals and inclusive while also extrinsiques to meet in phenomenology as in the quote of Hegel on the internal and the external.

   We are far here to negate the importance of Peirce in the discussion of this theme, in fact, the concept of correlate which title this essay and the book was initially proposed by Peirce, we return to Peirce several times in this sense, but the point in question is to say that we need to integrate today conceptualism, nominalism and positivism into phenomenology.

    But what I mostly want to point out here is about that the need of the earlier cares of positivism ---analytical philosophy, philosophy of language, etc—even retheorized today after the suspicious objections—is pivotal over all if we are thinking from the point of view of social sciences about objective forms of material and immaterial culture, dealing with a social world of reality and human beings, to recognize the fact that if within the subject of positivism cares we maintain differed what an immanence might be is precisely to ever return on it each time in a distinct mode so as to stay assure between what pertain to us or belong to us as subjects and subjectivities and what belong to another kind of immanence such as substances, time, god, theology, chemical o physical events, etc distinguishing self-alterity from other things like for example when the becoming and the happening pertain to social or cultural, language events instead of another kinds of fall out.

   Such a care reconsidered is far to be pointed to be exaggerated or caricaturized in the form of deformed exteriorizations but as I sustained somewhere before if the cold distance of the subject in front of the object we have in earlier positivism is ethically questionable and problematic the opposite is not less questionable, as much as the rigid form of cold distance, the indiferentiation evolved in the unknown of the natural need of extrinsecation unknown by the same reason the exteriority that is required by the natural ethic of relations.

   And as well as we know and we are agree on how Frankford school opposite positivism under the objection of the resistance of earlier positivism to let it be meet later by the negation of the negation as a way to solve dialectically the issue of immanence something coincidence with the objections that Hegel addressed to the supremacy of a rigid I in transcendental idealism, the cares and ascetic behavior of the earlier positivist subject was also related with stopping substance.

   Stoping an undefined immanence’s such as those evolved in the relation between being and couples since in the simple is of the couple we don’t know to differentiate when it is about us, when on a substance, when about pure time, when about god, when an event of culture, society and language, in such a sense we need to precise each time the consistency of it and stablish in respect the adequate method of relation also ethically and morally speaking.

   From the side of the philosophy of language such a discernment obtained significant results because as much as a rigid positioning of subject and object as extrinsique evolve moral deformations the indistintions may leads to no less deformed, ethically and morally bad consequences.

   Let then speak best on the reincorporation’s under a neo or neo neo in respect to the level of positivity which must be recognized since before as Peirce earlier anticipated it inside phenomenology to in the light of XXI century asimile the best and rejects the remains, we should not forget, in fact, that while the tradition of phenomenological sociology and self-sociology born from phenomenology it is impossible to figure out the grow up and born of it without the previous cares of analytical philosophy and the philosophy of language as well as we can’t simply forget the importance of comte in Bourdieu sociology of taste.

  Let then advance to a conclusive closure in our deliberations at the starting of this essay concerning about the relations between an outside of language and an inside of language, on the one hand, and about the relation between language and world, language and reality on the other toward my proposal concept of world correlate.

   I would like in fact to call out here and propose my concept of world correlate meeting some sense correlate play in earlier Peirce with a certain sense it acquired within literary criticism especially in the tradition of narratology.

   Within Pearce the correlate was an amazing solution to solve the dilemma of the duplicity of the sign defined by moments of the object reflected under it—representatement—a moments of indicating, addressing, detonating it referentially—ground while thought he interpretant taking shape a chain of translations between signs to the order of meaning replace the object, the correlate appeared here to solve that coexistence of something related with the object or the referent but independent to it --so inside/outside at the same time--as well as in the place of it.

       In literary criticism this notion was related with the type of narrators from the so-called omniscient narrator who as the author have the domain of the entery world created by the fiction including the characters to the several forms of hexotopies by which such a main omniscient narrator, sometimes the author, sometime a narrator created by the author, distribute the level of distance between type of narrators inside fiction and the production of the idea of world evoqued by the symbolic mimesis of fiction.

    I recognized a certain interest in such a differentiation levels between moments of the texts by the effects of distance between omniscience and hexotopia within the text as a form of correlate, but my purposiveness in getting some aspects of the concept of correlate in Peirce semiotic with this meaning of correlate in narratology is defined by a decision to empty certain meaning of the concept erasing from the concept all its relation with fiction and the world of mimesis and dramaturgy to instead understand it as formal concept in term of formal logic.

    The procedure at this point consist about recognizing the text as an instance from which the idea of world is a correlate but in regard to the relation between the immediacy of the world of experience more accurately the intramundane horizont and the several levels of sobreordination evolved in the hexotopies of making references to it so that the correlate of the world by the text variete through a diversity of forms travel in between highly levels of sobreordination when the world is an effect of the text as its correlate and highly level of immediacy as when we are directly in life word and the intramundane horizont hermeneutucs elucidations and pragmatics, to solve and get the pass by from world itself to reflected and phenomenological worlds, from the immediacy to symbolism, from experience to inscription.

    In this form the concept of world correlate acquire a methodological dimension to both theoretical thinking and empirical research as well as the Peirce interpretant acquire a dimension within the topoi’s of the theoretical text that allow us to increase and enlarge and reach of the interpretant at several levels of correlate, instead of a translation of one sign by the other, here the procedure let us to explore essays as interpretants of another essays, books as interpretants of another books thinking in a same author and mainly in how I conceive as author the relation between my own books

   The play with the interpretant retheorized at this level from a textualist reconsideration of the world correlate allow us also to explore the interpretant in empirical research regarding cultures in the sense of cultural theory, one culture as interpretant of another, one structure as interpretants of another toward cultural translations in which the concept of translation is far to mean translating simply idioms, but levels of comprehension and equivalences.

   Now the main question defined to attain in this essay is not as much one on how to empty and retheorize a concept but before well about the dilemma and paradoxes of the issue about if there is or not more or less an exit to language and in this sense the concept of world correlate as I am retheorizing and proposing it mediate a solution.

   In fact, I am sustaining here that even Derrida cant avoid the exteriority that ever will locate language between external matters such as for example thought and being. While derrida sustained that the subject is a function of language following Saussure, he himself recognized the privilege of both of the conscience, of presence, of thought, of alive present, of being and although his objective was focused in developing a certain idea of text such an idea of texere he sustained revealed that the edge of such a weaves goes enough outside and beyond before and after a supposed to be absolute inside of language something according to which the stratus of expression are extrinsiques to language thus as also the noematic and eidetic stratus of discourse.

   Such an outside is even obvious seen from the world of life intramundane horizont as well as under intersubjective communication.

   Now well, certainly, each major concept such as self, I, being, etc., ss discussed above, are of course also inside language or to be more précise it also have an expression inside language, in fact everything is inside language as well so that we need to think on this issue as a simultaneity or in terms of too and also, inside and outside, one time we have a self as a function internal to language but another time with have a pure self-outside the system of signs something about which sociology is more attentive than linguistic and the theory of the text.

   Now my concept of world correlate as discussed in this paper is precisely the one which mediate both moment solving the contradiction, without a world correlate the purity of concepts outside language and the system of sign is impossible to be figured out also inside language as when the sense of a world is a correlate of the text and in reverse, without a sense of the world correlate it is impossible to figure out how concepts considered inside the system of signs and or trapped inside the text may be at the same time considered outside of it

     The dilemma itself leads us to the ontological relation between being, thought and language and as such is an aporetical one if we don’t consider its two forms inside and outside, inside-outside, outside-inside as well as when the inside is the outside and in reverse as Hegel showed, what should we consider as primary or first thought or language is the question here?, the question can’t be answered without affirming both things at the same time something about which derrida realize to let it open.

  In front of that my concept of world correlate proposes a new balance, a correlate is here nor only a world in respect to a text a sense more near to my conceptualization of the notion, but also an equivalence between the plots of the symbolic and the plots of the real according to which a translation in between take shape, meaning, on the one hand modes of the immediacy of the world undertanded as quotidian and as culture and modes of symbolism and of symbolic plots relative to a world, both level made correlate in the mode of interpretants and translations.

   All the time an idea of world is endowed or expressed in langue is already a correlate of the text, but the level of conceptuality between language and world are differenced in between phenomenologically and hermeneutically from the immediacy to the supradiscourse level of sobreordination and of representational simbolizations as well.

  It is not the same the hermeneutic and phenomenology of an ideal of world as expressed in a text than the representation of a world, in the former the ontology is hermeneutical in the last one the ontology is mimetic, in the former there is not a world as the object of a representation which try to bring the law of representation in language to forms of the world as its effects whence when the idea of reality is produced by the control of the effects of representation but intelligible elucidations of the hermeneutics that weaves a world. In the last one there is a symbolization of a world as a replacement of the object by the sign as Peirce showed, the concept of correlate is here semiotically offering the possibility to mediate the contradiction.

  Peirce in fact earlier desisted of the immediate datas of the senses thus as to the relation between the sensible and the intelligible so as to take distance far from the point of view of the materiality of the sign as from the process of meaning inclining himself to symbolism, but his semiotic was not mimetic in the sense of repiting in the forms of language the forms of reality, it was instead a sense of replacement.

  In this sense my retheorization of the world correlate attain to demonstrate the priority of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity as the final last question evolved in the dilemma instead of the relation between representation and reality so in a form that the idea of world appears as a correlate and not as a prototype of mimesis.

  Mimesis in fact dominated in a certain measure a considerable part of poshegelianism as obvious in certain works of Benjamin and adorno and as well as in adorno aesthetic theory which preserve majorly conceptual abstractions as well as the principles of inmaterialization and dematerizalization resulting from it, something about which I am agree with, while the concept of correlate is completely absent from it.

   I have preferred in this sense to theorize a concept of world correlate adequate to the phenomenology and the texere and the text as discussed by derrida as well as to the distinctions made by Bourdieu on how the forms of material culture are form of subjectivity and in reverse the forms of subjectivity forms of the objective culture thus as to consider deleuze distinctions between subjectivity and empiricism

We thought that we had located –sustained deleuze on this regard- the essence of empiricism in the specific problem of subjectivity, but first of all we should ask how subjectivity is defined. The subject is defined by the movements through which it is developed. Subject is that which developed itself. The only content that we can give to the idea of subjectivity is that of mediation and transcendence. But we note that the movement of self-development and of becoming other is continuous, the subject transcendent itself but it is also reflected upon. Hume recognize this two dimensions, presenting them as the fundamental characteristics of human nature: inference and invention, belief and artifice, in short believing and inventing is what makes the subject a subject. We are also subjects in another respect, the subject invents, it is the maker of artifice.

   Such is the dual form of subjectivity, to believe and to invent …the problem is a follow, how can a subject transcending the given be constituted in the given?. Undoubtedly, that which transcend the given is also given, in another way and in another sense. The subject who invents and believes is constituted inside the given in such a way that it makes the given itself a synthesis and a system, weask, how is the subject constituted in the give?, the construction of the given makes room for the constitution of the subject. But what is the given?, it is say Hume the flux of the sensible, a collection of impressions and images, or a set of perceptions.

Gilles Deleuze

Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essays on Hume theory of human nature

Columbia university press

     Only in this form as soon as theorized the relations between interiority and exteriority of us in front of language and of language, world and reality needed to tie up epistemological and methodological issues implicit to my concept of world correlate we may return both theoretically and empirically defined in the research to that calmed reality of a suprasensible world that Hegel so brilliantly synthetized in the quote start this essay on the ontology of reality as a meeting of the inside and the outside, world itself and the phenomenological world.

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Hernandez Sam Juan Abdel, Anthropology of Archaeology: A Perspective from Ethnometodology and Cultural Anthropology, Selected Essays, Book

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Intramundane Horizont, Complete Works, Tome VI, Book, 2017

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Self and Acerbo: The self and the social Between writing, research and culture, complete works, tome VIII

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Presentational Linguistic, Complete works, tome III, Book, 2005

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, Complete works, tome IV, Book, 2006

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Given and the Ungiven, Complete works, tome V, book, 2007

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, phenomenological Anthropology, selected Essays

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, the indeterminist true, selected essays

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, the constellation of common Sense, sociology of common sense and Anthropology ResearchTheory, selected essays

Sini Carlos, Peirce, Semiótica y Filosofía, Hachete

Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Science of Logic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegel's Logic of World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929 translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, Prometheus; Later Printing edition (December 1, 1991), Humanity books, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

Hegel, Ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete