Thinking science chapter 2 end

From this moment essence and substance are no longer there.

   In short, concepts are inmaterials, they are like fractal matter and inner time etters in regard to matter by analogy and nothing like substance and essence are longer there.

  The genesis of concepts is by the way different than the genesis of conscience, self-conscience and "the I" even when they are related in certain forms inside the general theory of the formation of subject and subjectivity, the concept is already constituted and formed in a manner which transform in concept the multiplicity evoqued by the object and only through the formation of the concept the mediation born up and take shape conceal and eliminate both alterity and otherness which oppose as others one and the other, subject and object.

   Certainly it can’t be figured out a way to be subjects without having conscience, self-conscience and "the I" but we might said the same in the opposite way that nothing as having conscience, self-conscience and "the I" is possible to be figured out without being subjects to objects

   The scientific demonstration about that this genesis is simultaneous, that the subject was already there become tangible when we perceive that it is impossible to figure out a field of sensoriality coming from the palpable sensoritality of the sensible multiplicity if is this is not already as soon as figuring it out and simultaneously a form of the subject assure.

   This subject assure in fact is no itself yet a reflect, nor a repetition reflected as a mimesis of the data of senses, no yet, but only a concept, certainly conscience and self-conscience are in general near than the subject and subjectivity to palpable sensoriality because of the reflected forms it have when images arriving from mimesis are there defining a reflexive field, but what happen with the subject in regard to such a previous sensible multiplicity of palpable sensoriality is precisely that to the subject it is not a reflect or reflected dimension, image are in fact no there as in conscience, but only objects as synthesis abstractions made by the concept which mediate sensibly in the both senses of the word tangible and intangible subject and object.

    The field of the subject is no one about reflect and reflection as in conscience but one about mediations.

  Simply because the subject is no ever and just seldom separated from the object as another thing as conscience are in respect to its images, a conscience will ever be another thing separated from its objects by reflects and reflection, a subject instead can be object and object a subject by becoming one into the other ontologically something impossible to be considered in regard to conscience, in short, we are speaking here on parallel series as well as on a dimension theoretically almost undiscussed which is easily to be demonstrated with my theory of the self, the self itself is located between immanence and exteriorization.

    Subject and object are, and here we will now call Hegel in another sense which is that one of his negative dialectiques, the same and the opposite, each one is contained in the other and inclusive to the other, what made a subject is the existence of objects and what made an object is the existence of subjects, something is a subject because it is not an object each one need the other inside it own identity and nature and in this relation subject can be object and object subject but only through the concept.

    In a few words, again, the relation between subject and object is a triadic one not a dyadic and triadic principles as for example sign-object and referent, are always of this kind:

                       subject-concept-object

   Both subject and object are themselves only through the concept which mediate them, the concept born up and take shape acquiring its nature to nothing else than to guaranty and made possible this sensible mediation, the field of a concept will be ever the field of this mediation in the source and origination of its own phenomenology, the major kid of comprehension, the concept born up to solve something that can’t be resolve by conscience.

   Through some concepts the nominal proximity between naming and things is here very near and certainly this is what distinguish concepts of non-concepts, as explained above, a rose is the name of something, but not a concept, instead in the concept of art, however, in naming it we have the entrance of both things what it is itself and its name, but it is also a concept while in difference with a concept as "being itself" when both sides of the concepts the one regarding itself –sensible multiplicities or palpable sensoriality---and the side of the abstracted dimension which transform it in the concept of an object to the subject—take shape as a mutual intelligibility, something we must call heuristic concepts, in the being itself of art seen as a sensible multiplicity or palpable sensoriality and art as the name whose abstraction is a concept of what the name meet and denotate as its object we don’t have the same kind of exchange of dimensions between ontology, abstraction and concept.

  To understand art as concept without confusing it for example with "being itself" which can be the being itself of anything we need to made abstraction of the ontology of it as a substance and as an essence since from the moment asking about art as concept evolve to us a way questions on almost everything, it is not the same thinking about being, self, memory, language, conscience, etc as things itself without art than asking on it through the filter of art since thinking on it from art and to do so the concept of art seems to be seen now as the object the concept mediate as inmaterial and dematerialized while paradoxically art seen as pure matter, as substance, chemistry and physical datas is itself ontologically the opposite of such inmaterialization and dematerialization needed by the concept.

   In the concept of art we have something unique to that concept, never as in art we have the counterposition and contrast between ontology as something substantial and the concept as something desubstantiated and inmaterial, this is a way to say that each concept might be considered a universe itself in the way the concept itself call the things to be related.

  In fact if we follow substance in art maintaining ourselves near to its palpable sensoriality dimensions we can’t made abstraction of the concept, to made abstraction of the concept we have to stablish a relation between the concept and its object which should be inferred by relating the theoretical and the empirical.

  In a few words, we must reserve to each concept different ways to understand how ontology and epistemology relates under it because a concept itself as a mediator between subject and object consist precisely in it, a concept is nothing else, but an specific form to exchange both dimensions sensibly mediating subject and object.

   The concept can’t be the true manifestation of substance since a concept precisely consist about deliberating an independent free way to figure out how epistemology and ontology, subject and object, should be exchanged and related, to do so we have to admit a simultaneity between subject and object and a coexistence in a form that the form of the exchange according to the concept eliminate causality, we can’t fix the form of exchange until having defined the way the concept will operate immaterialy on the how the two sides of the field designed by the nominal is asked to be related, such a deliberation draw itself the ways the exchange should be figured out as the concept will ever consist about sensibly mediating both moments.

   The concept in fact is nothing more that the stopping of substance, it negates the causality of substance and its manifestations, it is in fact the opposite of substance manifested, on the inmaterial side of meanings it fully made abstraction of substance and works without it in the form of delivering the relation between subject and the object while on the side of the relation between the object as abstraction of a palpable sensoriality and such an empirical field, as when the concept instead of fully abandoning form and matter intervene in taking shape as for example writing or giving form to certain matter, the concept reestablish and direct how, toward what and in what direction substance should be addressed.

  As obvious in art matter languages the so called in linguistic and semiotic substance of expression is nothing else but the concept immaterially operating substance towards its own inmaterial determinations of meanings and senses.

    Substantialism in ancient, classics and even certain modern epistemologies have confused the physiology of reflects in body and conscience with the concept, it also have in its basis a confusion between conceptualizing and conceiving.

    Conceiving can be made without any concept, while in certain kinds of things we conceive with concepts all the field of concepts in is not reduced to conceiving and the later one may occur many times without concepts in it.

   In effect, one distinct thing is acquiring a reflect or reflecting in the mode of conscience repetitions of images in reflecting reflected sensible multiplicities something related to perception and representation and another far and different thing is forming concepts, at the same time conceptualizing is another thing different to conceiving.

   If concept have to be deduced to the substantiality of a reality in the form of a manifestation the subject appear as a manifestation of the becoming of substance temporality and immanent essence. But that is impossible, the subject is a taking of distance to substance exposing it to be in front and beside, obligating it to be aside in front of the gaze under another different temporality which suppose the disting becoming, the one of the subject, the phenomenology of the concept belong to the subject not to substance.

  But it have a more deeper forms

  As sustained in my essays "The chrysalides of being" I agree with Hegel idea that in the last instance knowledge and science are a part in the logic of being, meaning, that the becoming of being continues evolving the becoming of thought, but at the same time, as sustained in that essay the becoming of the being of thought have consequences in the temporality of the becoming of being which is not yet the same as soon as thought appear or intervene, both are intratemporals and spatially and subject and object are simultaneous under it they goes at the same time when going and coming from one to the other is presupposing the subordination of substance to its towards.

  The event and the becoming of thought certainly involve inside it the event and the temporality of being and the opposite, but both are not the same already as soon as starting to exchange in between not if we try to look to each one being and thought separately in their own purity.

   Within its separated purity and abstraction a being can undoubtedly be without thought but such a being as simply purely a being without extrinsecation, it can’t be more that by moments or intervals because to acquire and give direction to its movement it have to assure on itself and to assure it have already to think.

  In the opposite sense we can figure out a thought without a being in it, but in such a purity of its abstraction a thought can’t address a movement it will simply stop becoming static, to be a thought have to be dynamic it have to let it be in the temporality of being or if not it will be immobilized, a thought which can’t flux in the becoming of pure being stop but the opposite too a being just being without thought become pure accidents.

    This is not a way to say that there is not knowledge in perception and representation, there is knowledge too in it without doubt as well as intellect and reason, but a way to say that concepts have its own specific phenomenology if we are really asking on what made a concept concept itself and nothing else.

     As Hegel clearly statement the concept is the apogee of thought in its own phrases something he sustained in debate with those who denigrate concepts but to be certain and proper conceptual thought take shape according to this triadic phenomenological principles as its own zone and field of operations two opposite’s subject and object and a sensible mediator in between the concept from which all the opposites are solved and solutioned, otherness, alterities and contradictions.

  From the moment concepts start to operate all exclusions are transformed into inclusions and the externals extrinsiques become transformed into internals intrinsiques becoming one with the other.

  It is curious and amazing but at the same time comprehensible in his age, how Hegel, the thinker who more than any one before him advanced the science of concept, was not capable in his age to advertise, recognize and discover this dialectique. His age was not ready yet even in his genius to unveil it.

   The relation between subject and object thanks to the concept is generative and productive.

Bibliography

Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Science of Logic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegel's Logic of World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, Prometheus; Later Printing edition (December 1, 1991), Humanity books, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

Hegel, Cual es el comienzo de la ciencia, Ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete

Hegel, Ciencia de la Lógica, Lógica del ser, Lógica de la Esencia, Lógica del Concepto, Hachete

Hegel, lógica del concepto, Ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete