Thinking science chapter 2 continuation

 How this happen?

     First we should unveil a near relation between nominalism and the concept by the mean of what object and subject seems to be or look to be meeting as abstractions, for example, when we said “being itself” we are speaking at the same time on something that is to our sensibility and feelings and something that is at the same time a concept because while we have a sensible impression about the to be of being itself such a "being itself" is already a concept, the concept "being itself".

   Moreover, in saying "being itself" we are saying, on the one hand something about a certitude we have as beings that something is itself and might be feel as such as something simply being in itself, meaning, in its pure sensibility and its pure being without yet having a distance to it more than in the pure becoming of it and its feelings, to this point "being itself" is not yet considered as a concept but as experience, but at the same time this "being itself" designe, denote and or connote such a universe of sensations and assure of experience.

   As a word or relation between two words "being" and "itself", the name evolve a synthesis of all that field of senses and as such is a concept, the name, nominalism, and the concept are usually very nears sometimes the same while not always as we will discuss.

   From the moment the word as name is a concept all that field que word design to sensibility and experience become to the subject an object, whence what before we designed as experience and sensible assure and self-assure as soon as we see it from the subject as object to the subject, it is already a concept, then, as discussed, the name, such a nominality designing "being itself" with the semantic field of connotation to our experience it evolves is to the subject we are at the same time its object and the concept of that object.

   We should said that indeed it is an object from the moment we assure on it but granted that in this case such a something allude directly to our sensibility and experience, it is an object in ourselves, meaning we as individuals as to many individuals who have a similar experience.

  We ask if "being itself" being an object only to the subject knowledge can be in itself without the subject to which the word or the name enclose all that field of meanings to sensibility, feeling and sensoriality? and we answer that it can’t, it is both an experience and an object only to us and certainly as soon as we are not only living to be a "being itself" as when experiencing it without assuring on it but assuring it all that field become an object to us but at the same time it can’t become an object without becoming a concept at the same time, the object and the concept meet and share here as the same, nominalism and conceptualism, the same and the abstraction which transform the field of experience into a concept of an object is what make of it a concept and the opposite, the mode how the concept synthesis and resume the field of our experience and sensibility.

   Concept, of course, may be not confused with the sensible experience itself, neither the object of that becoming when assuring on it from the subject, but it is the subject the one who give configuration to that experience as object in the concept, only tthe word with all the field of experience and sensibility it suggests is a concept.

   As seen whence in naming as a nominal act when we said "being itself" two planes meets in one dimension "object and the concept", but this two planes are interrelated, the object refers to the sensible experience but the sensible experience can’t be the object without being to the subject a concept and it can less be an object without becoming concept, its then the concept the one which made the mediation between subject and object and this mediation is sensible itself in the both senses discussed above about the need to make distinctions between two levels of the sensible.

  We ask to some other what it means to you "being itself", how can you explain the consistency of that concept?, and from such a moment we conclude that all concept evolve in itself an explanation hence what make it an object is not simply its reference to an experience but what is synthetized and abstracted under it as concept in regard to an experience becoming object to the subject.

   Given than the object is formed in itself on the one hand by the sensible experience it denotes or circumscribe and at the same time it coincidence with the word-name denotating it we said that the concept operates usually in a nominal field, a field in which the name of things and things are related.

   Now well, concept in its abstraction evolve nor only an explanation, we should also assure that it evolve and suppose an intemporal dimension, meaning, an stable and continues form which define it as concept, "being itself", for example, as a concept will never be the concept of "time", "being itself" bring us addressing a well define territory of meaning on our feelings and sensations, while time as concept enclose another kind of senses evolved in that concept, each concept is then as an island of circumscribed senses as something relatibly invariable, meaning that it permanence in that form in an stable form without variations while relatibly because we always have semantical variations.

   For example, "being itself" is not the same on it as a pure abstraction referential to the pure feeling of being as a being to sensibility or if we are speaking on the "being itself" of a culture or an individual person or about the being itself of science, however, the semantique variations expand around a kernel, nucleus or center to its possible semantic variations relationalities, this is a nucleus of the concept meaning explanation.

  This hard nucleus should be distinguishdd from mere words which are not concepts but means something, a cat mean something, a certain quadrupeds animal of certain characteristics, but is neither a concept, running is not a concept and however cognnotate something, breakfast and opening the door are not concepts.

   Certainly we can made concepts of simple words and objects by train it "as if" through the relation between name and meaning, but this words and objects are not concepts themselves.

    To be concepts it have to acquire an intemporal dimensions and invariability that will acquire independence as abstraction to the mere nominal and will transcend the mere denotation, in a concept something will ever be a corpus of meanings that can operate within a variety of empirical issues.

    The concept of time, for example, it is nominally like any name a meeting between the concept and the empirical field of sensoriality and sensibility it evoques or detonates, but it will be something more too, time will ever be time to anyone with any experience and culture calling certain invariability of experience and certitudes to any subject intemporaly, time will ever be a hard nucleus of meanings at the same time conserved under the concept, but time will also be different things, for example, according to Aristoteles time is not a part inside the ontology of being, according to him a being never contain inside its own nature time, time in itself is not of the same nature than being, but from another perspective being mean something that is in movement to be something have to become, and as such it have to be in time so that time is also inside it, it can’t be defined without time inside it, hence we can sustain on the same concept a definition opposite to the Aristoteles one, he payed attention to certain aspects of the concept but excluding others, his perspective focused in how time is the same to different beings in time at the same time, while excluded considering how being as time is needed for it to be.

   While any concept has a hard nucleus explain it the meanings are open to variations and situational modifications and of theories around. Some concepts are more added to their nucleus, other concepts are flexible around it as for example, "being itself" already discussed, we see how it can be about the itself of a person, of a language, of a culture, of a science, etc

   A concept for example as inscription supposes the fixation of something on a surface, on a memory retained or in a body, a same general sense to completely different empirical fields, the intemporality of the concept stay the same and its name coincidence in a same surface simultaneously at different phenomena’s, the concept and its objects.

  A concept is always the field a name design the reason to recognize the relation between nominalism and conceptualism, a concept is ever be beside what such a designation mean to the subject as otherness when the concept born up as concept, meaning that a concept born up as a concept of its objects.

   In fact if we don’t have the concept subject and object are not available to exchange in between, each one stay as the otherness and opposite of the other without any relation in between or rather, in any case related in the alterity because even when the object pass by to be a subject as in the example when we represent our conscience in itself conscience just because in moving from the external to the internal of subjectivity the subject return to alterizice that relation again and transform it even being a moment of himself in an object, only through the concept the object past by to be a subject and become one with the subject inside subjectivity as alterity.

  The relation between subject and object hence whatever we are speaking on the object as otherness to the subject or the subject itself becoming object taking distance from that side of himself to turn it an object need the concept to acquire the mediation, only through the concept an object pass by to be one with the subject given that it is in the subject were the concept take shape.

   The concept itself is nothing else than the abstraction of the object, only in the concept subject and object are mutuality mediated, it is in fact the sensible mediation of one by the other both inside subjectivity when the object become one with the subject and outside before or simultaneously when the object seems to be a form of the sensible multiplicities.

   In such cases as discussed somewhere before like for example in space and time such a before outside is also in the subject in another way and in another form different to the form it acquire in conscience reflexion, or as in the case of "being itself" already discussed, nothing regarding mediations between subject and object such as those required to recognize the subject in the object and in reverse the object becoming one inside subject is possible without the mediation of the concept, and this mediation is not only abstract but sensible in the specific sense we have discussed above about the two dimensions of sensibility the one related with sensible multiplicities involved within palpable sensoriality and the one evolving inmaterialization and dematerialization, by the way only through the concept the subject can also recognize himself as an object between the objects.

  Returning to "being itself" as concept as soon as the concept is no longer that object which was by a moment an otherness and or an alterity to the assure of the subject on himself seen from the gazing of ourselves in subjectivity the object end to be by disappearing in the becoming one with the subject, it have passed by to be one and the same with subjectivity or more precisely, it have become to be from our subjectivity and as a concept of "being itself" but in this turning to be one with our subjectivity the substance is no longer there, indeed it had never ceased to be both things at the same time something outside which is itself and something the subject abstract in the becoming of an object created in front of its otherness as self alterization in subjectivity.